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  Abstract  
 
 
The potential influence of peers and social networks on individual outcomes is important 
to a variety of educational policy debates including school vouchers, special education, 
middle school grade configurations and tracking.   Researchers usually address the 
identification problems associated with credibly estimating peer effects in these settings 
but often do not account for ad-hoc definitions of peer-groups.   In this paper, we use 
extensive information on peer groups to demonstrate that accurate definitions of the peer 
network seriously impact estimation of peer effects.  We estimate the effect of peers’ 
smoking, drinking, sexual behavior and educational achievement on a teen’s propensity to 
engage in like-minded behavior and address the major identification problems that plague 
estimation of these effects.  
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   I.    Introduction 
    The potential effect of peers and social networks on individual behavior is a source of 
debate in many policy contexts.  Economists have explored effects of peers on school 
participation decisions (Cipollone and Rosolia, 2003;  Gaviria and Raphael, 2001;  Bobonis and 
Finan, 2006), on worker productivity (Mas and Moretti, 2006), on choice of medical school 
specialty (Arcidiacono and Nicholson, 2005), on utilization of prenatal care (Aizer and Currie, 
2005), and on retirement savings behavior (Duflo and Saez, 2002) among others.  Previous 
research addresses the difficult econometric issues in identifying social interactions.  However, 
very few papers directly address the ad-hoc manner in which peer groups are often defined.   
An informal sampling of the literature in educational peer effects shows the frequent use 
of school-grade cohorts as the peer group of interest (Appendix A).  It is unclear whether school-
grade cohorts are the true peer group in operation or whether school-grade cohorts merely 
influence the composition of closer friendship ties, which in turn affect peer outcomes.  In this 
paper, we use the Adolescent Health Survey (Add Health Data) to explore the way in which peer 
group definitions impact estimates of the effect of adolescent peers on propensities to achieve 
good grades in school, to smoke, to drink and use drugs, and to engage in risky sexual behavior. 
One benefit of using the Add Health Data is the existence of self-reported friend groups.  Using 
this information, we are able to estimate social interaction effects using precisely defined friend 
groups and compare to estimates using school-grade cohort or classroom averages.  We call this 
the definitional component of measurement error and show that it can be quite large.   
Educational policymakers are particularly interested in quantifying the effect of peers on 
adolescent behavior because of the long-term consequences of adolescent choices.  As a result, 
the existence and size of peer effects hold important implications in a number of educational 
  2policy debates.
1  In comparing these effects across varying definitions of ‘peer group’, we see 
that these definitions are important to identifying correct effects for policy.  If the most important 
peer influences occur at the level of individual friendship ties, a finding of positive school-grade 
cohort effects does not capture the true parameter of interest.  In fact, the true effect will depend 
on the sorting of students into friend groups and cannot be directly inferred from the school-
grade correlations.  Therefore, school-wide policies based on estimates of school-grade cohort 
effects will not necessarily be effective.   
Unfortunately, the effort to estimate peer effects is complicated by a number of other 
empirical issues as well.  In particular, it is difficult to separately identify the endogenous peer 
effect from other contextual and correlated effects.  For example, when we observe correlations 
between individual and peer group GPA’s, we are not always able to discern whether this 
correlation arises because 1) individuals who get good grades tend to associate with friends who 
also get good grades, or 2) individuals are influenced by their peers to get good grades.  If the 
first, policy affects only the outcomes of the targeted individuals, if the second, policy has an 
impact on outcomes that is magnified by a social multiplier effect.  Though we focus on the 
definitional component of measurement error, we also address these identification issues. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows:  section II describes the data, section 
III summarizes the empirical approach and its accompanying estimation issues, and section IV 
                                                 
1  Discussions on school choice policies address concerns over the influence of high-performing students on their 
lower-performing counterparts and vice versa (for example, Cullen, Jacob, and Levitt, 2006).  Both proponents and 
detractors of tracking policies within elementary and secondary schools ask these same questions (for example, 
Lefgren, 2004).  The current debate over optimal school grade configurations asks whether or not older students 
have a negative impact on the educational outcomes of their younger peers (Bedard and Do, 2005). Discussions of 
single-sex versus co-educational classrooms involve questions of gender-based peer effects (Whitmore, 2005).  And 
special education policymakers express concern over the effect of special education peers on the educational 
outcomes of their regular education counterparts and vice versa (for example, Hanushek, et al 2002).  Furthermore, 
an important current strand of research in public policy, child psychology, and education documents concern that 
treatments which isolate and segregate youths engaged in risky behaviors may exacerbate the problem if these teens 
teach, encourage and reward further deviant behavior in their peers (for example, Dodge, Dishion, Lansford, 2006).   
  3describes the construction of peer group definitions in detail.  In sections V and VI we discuss 
the main findings of the paper, and section VII concludes. 
 
II. Data 
We use data from the National Longitudinal Adolescent Health Survey (Add Health). 
The Add Health survey was conducted by the Carolina Population Center and is available for a 
nationally representative sample of students who were in seventh through twelfth grades in 1994.  
We use data from two waves of the survey: Wave I was conducted in 1994-95 and Wave II in 
1996. The Wave I survey consists of an In-School questionnaire which was filled out by 90,118 
students in 145 schools in 80 communities. A subset of 20,745 students was then chosen for an 
in-depth In-Home survey. The Wave II survey includes an In-Home questionnaire which was 
completed by 14, 738 students.   
The 145 schools in the Wave I survey consist of pairs of sister schools.  That is, if a 
particular high school was included in the survey, the corresponding feeder junior high or middle 
school was also included.  If a school spanning seventh through twelfth grades was chosen for 
the survey, no sister school was included. 
Students in each wave were asked detailed questions about their choices to smoke, drink 
alcohol, and engage in risky sexual behaviors. They were also asked about their performance in 
school, including grades in English, math, science, and social studies. Using this information, we 
construct four variables: the number of cigarettes the student smokes in an average day, the 
number of times in the past year the student drank alcohol, whether or not the student has ever 
had sex, and the student’s average grade point average.
2  We measure the effects of peers on 
                                                 
2 The variable for average number of drinks per year is a categorical variable ranging from 0 for never to 6 for 
nearly every day or every day.  We transform it to be a cardinal variable which takes on a value of 0 for “never 
  4these four outcome variables.  Descriptive statistics for the outcome variables and all other 
control variables are reported in Table 1A. 
 
Peer Networks 
  The Add Health survey is particularly useful for our purposes because of the extensive 
data on friendship networks.  Using this information, we are able to define peer groups more 
accurately and precisely than has been possible in many previous studies.  In each of the surveys, 
students are asked to nominate five female friends and five male friends. In almost all cases, 
students report fewer than five male and five female friends indicating that they are not 
constrained in their choice of friends in their network by the ten-friend limit.  These friend 
nominations include both friends in the same school as well as friends from outside of school.  
Because we do not have information on friends outside of the respondent’s school, we are unable 
to include them in our measures of average peer group behavior.  Assuming friends outside of 
school have a different peer impact on respondents than friends in the same school, this missing 
information will bias our estimates.  However, the vast majority of friend nominations are to 
other students in the same school; on average only 15% of friend nominations are to friends 
outside of the respondent’s school.  There are also sizeable numbers of nominations to friends 
that are not found on the school rosters.  In the In-School Wave I sample, for example, 
approximately eight percent of nominations are not found on the school rosters.  This may be due 
to the mixed use of nicknames and official names, students who are new to the school, or errors 
in school records.  We drop these observations from the analysis.   
                                                                                                                                                             
drank”, 365 for “nearly every day”, 30 for “two to three times a month”, etc.  The recoded variable counts how 
many days the person drank alcohol in the past year. 
  5  The first and third rows of Table 1B report summary statistics on the average number of 
friends in the Add-Health peer networks for the In-Home and In-School files.  We do not include 
friends who attend other schools or whose information can not be found in the surveys.  The 
average number of nominations in the In-Home and In-School data is 1.27 and 3.91 respectively.  
Because the In-Home file surveys a substantially smaller subset of the In-School population, the 
data for a given respondent’s nominated friend is often not available in the In-Home sample.  
This is the primary reason for the discrepancy in the average size of the In-Home peer groups 
versus the In-School peer groups. 
 
III.    Estimation 
Identification Issues 
The standard approach to estimating peer effects is given by:   
u ' w ]' x | w [ ] x | y [   y + λ + γ Ε + Ε β + α = , (1) 
where y is the outcome of interest (GPA, smoking, sexual behavior, or drinking), x is a vector of 
group characteristics, w is a vector of individual characteristics, and u is an idiosyncratic error 
term.   Following Manksi (1995), we assume that  δ = Ε ' x ] w , x | u [  and rewrite equation (1) as 
follows: 
δ + λ + γ Ε + Ε β + α = Ε ' x ' w ]' x | w [ ] x | y [   ] w , x | y [  (2) 
We observe that the behavior of individuals in groups can be conceptually separated into three 
strands of effects:  contextual effects, correlated effects, and endogenous peer effects.  Contextual 
effects ( ) arise when “the propensity of an individual to behave in some way varies with the 
distribution of background characteristics in the group”.  For example, the tendency of student 
achievement to vary with socioeconomic background would be considered a contextual effect.  
0 ≠ γ
  6Correlated effects ( ) describe “the propensity of individuals in the same group to behave 
similarly because they face similar institutional environments or have similar individual 
characteristics”.  For example, students in the same school may tend to achieve similarly because 
they face the same teachers and curriculum.  Endogenous peer effects ( ) refer to the 
propensity of an individual to behave “in (ways that vary) with the prevalence of that behavior in 
that group”.  For example, a student may influence his friend to get good grades and the friend in 
turn may induce the student to get good grades.   
0 ≠ δ
0 ≠ β
  As noted earlier, we are interested in identifying endogenous effects separately from 
correlated and contextual effects because of the potential policy implications of positive 
endogenous effects.  In the presence of endogenous effects, policy will have a social multiplier 
effect.  Absent endogenous effects, policy will have no such effect. 
 
Empirical Approach 
An empirical counterpart to equation (1) is: 
ist s is ist ist x y y ε + δ + λ + β = , (3) 
where   denotes an outcome for individual i in school s at time t and   denotes a vector of 
individual i's observable characteristics or observed heterogeneity, 
ist y is x
s δ  is a school effect and  ist ε  
is a time-variant unobserved component to individual behavior.   ist y  denotes the average 
behavior of individual i’s peers.  We discuss the construction of ist y in greater detail in section IV.  
The parameter of interest β  estimates the extent to which peers influence an individual’s 
behavior.   
    Our first set of regressions includes a set of school dummies and a comprehensive set 
of observed covariates in the regression equation.  This is similar to the procedure used by 
  7Arcidiacano and Nicholson (2005).  The inclusion of school fixed effects helps to mitigate 
endogeneity bias stemming from omitted correlated effects.  However, it does not account for 
any unobserved individual-level heterogeneity within schools that is also correlated with average 
group behavior.  In addition, the procedure does nothing to solve the biases resulting from 
potential correlation between  ist ε  and  ist y .  Both of these concerns suggest that this procedure 
will yield an upper bound onβ . 
Our second set of regressions includes uses average background characteristics of the 
group member’s parents to instrument for average group behavior while controlling for a 
complete set of school dummies and exogenous covariates.  In order to identify equation (3) 
using instrumental variables estimation, we assume the absence of contextual effects (i.e. 0 = γ ).  
This type of exclusion restriction is discussed by Manski (1995) and is used quite frequently in 
the peer effects literature (e.g. Gaviria and Raphael 2001).  The instrumental variables are 
averages of dummy variables for whether or not the mothers and fathers of the peer group 
members have college degrees.  We maintain that the educational attainment of the respondent’s 
friends’ parents affects his behavior only through his friends’ influence and never directly.   
Meanwhile, the inclusion of the school dummies and exogenous covariates continues to address 
biases associated with the correlated effects.  If either the exclusion restriction or the instruments 
are invalid, the estimates of β  will be biased.
3  Because we expect a positive correlation 
between the unobserved individual effects and the average background characteristics of peers, 
the IV estimate of β  may again biased upwards.     
                                                 
3 While it is possible, in principle, to estimate the model in first differences while instrumenting for the difference in 
group behavior with the level of the instrument at baseline as in Arellano Bond (1991), such a procedure is in 
practice not very useful because these instruments become very weak once the endogenous variable is differenced. 
 
  8The estimation is complicated further by potential measurement error in ist y .  
Measurement error in this context comes from two possible sources:  reporting errors in peer 
behaviors and errors in the definition of peer groups.   Reporting error refers to the standard 
measurement error resulting from mistakes in reporting and recording data.  The definitional 
component of measurement error stems from incorrect or imprecise definition of peer groups.  In 
other words, the researcher may define the group to be   when in reality, the group is .  
One of the main weaknesses of the peer effects literature is its inability to precisely define the 
peer group.  Manski (1995) states, “Researchers studying social effects rarely offer empirical 
evidence to support their specifications of reference groups.”  Definitions of peer groups are 
often ad-hoc (Appendix A) and depend more on availability of data than a theoretically justified 
definition of “peers”.    
*
ist G ist G
 
IV.  Defining the Networks 
To better understand the role that network definitions play in the identification of 
endogenous peer effects, we estimate equation (3) using three different network definitions.  Our 
first definition of the peer group (we call this definition “Friends”) uses information from the 
Add Health friendship network to construct average levels of smoking, drinking, sex, and grade 
point averages across nominated friends.  This definition only includes friends directly 
nominated by the respondent and is limited to at most five male and five female friends.  The 
summary statistics for average network outcomes are in row 1 of Table 1C.  We also report 
  9summary statistics for the maximum and minimum of network behavior as defined by 
and . } G j : y { max ist jst
j
∈ } G j : y min{ ist jst
j
∈
4   
Our second network definition (which we call “Extended Friends”) uses all nominated 
friends from the first definition as well as all friends of nominated friends.  Formally, this 
network is defined as  
















.   
ist G  includes all friends from the first network definition.     includes all friends of 
friends.  The term  excludes the individual from his own network.  We construct a weighted 














ist ist y N y where  jist ω is the number of 







ist N .  This weighting 
procedure gives more weight to individuals who are “more present” in the extended network and, 
thus, allows for a “mover and shaker” effect.   
The averages for   for the In-Home and In-School files are reported in rows two and 
four of Table 1B.  The size of these networks is substantially larger than with the first network 
definition.  In the In-Home data, the average network size goes from 1.27 for the friends network 
to 4.53 for the extended friends network.  In the In-School data, it moves from 3.91 for the 
friends network to 26.83 for the extended friends network.  The summary statistics for the 
average, maximum and minimum of behaviors in these networks are given in the second row of 
E
ist N
                                                 
4 Note that because our outcome variable on sexual behavior is binary, we do not report descriptive statistics on its 
maximum and minimum. 
 
  10Table 1C.  Note that because the first network definition is a proper subset of this definition, the 
maxima over these networks get bigger and the minima get smaller. 
Our third definition of the peer group is a school-grade cohort.  This is the most 
commonly used definition in the educational peer effects literature.  Summary statistics of the 
mean, max and min of the network behavior are reported in row 3 of Table 1C.  When 
calculating the descriptive statistics for these networks, we again exclude the individual from his 
own network. 
 
Within Individual Variation in Peer Behavior 
Next, we consider the degree of variation in peer average outcomes within individuals or 
schools.  Without enough variation in these outcomes, our estimates will yield large standard 
errors.  We find that with school fixed-effects regressions, this problem is more pronounced 
when we define peers as a school-grade cohort and less pronounced when we define peers using 
friendship ties or extended friendship ties.   
In Figures 1 and 2, we calculate the difference between  ist y  and the school-level or 
individual-level average of ist y .  We then plot the non-parametric density estimates of these 
differences for three separate outcome variables: GPA, sexual behavior and smoking.  Each plot 
contains three densities each corresponding to the three network definitions:  friendship ties, 
extended friendship ties, and school-grade cohorts.  Figure 1 shows the plot of within-individual 
variation across outcomes and network definitions.  We see that for all three outcomes and all 
three network definitions, there is very little variation.  This suggests that a panel data fixed-
effects estimator will be inefficient.  Therefore, we do not present our results for individual fixed 
effects regressions and focus on the results from the school fixed effects regressions.  In Figure 
  112, we plot within-school variation and see striking differences across network definitions.   
Similar to the densities in Figure 1, there is little variation when networks are defined as school-
grade cohorts.  However, contrary to the densities in Figure 1, there is substantial variation when 
networks are defined based on friend nominations and extended friendship ties.   
The results in Figure 2 raise an interesting issue when using the school-grade cohort 
definition to estimate peer effects.  On one hand, inclusion of school dummies allows researchers 
to account for the unobserved school-level heterogeneity that is almost certainly correlated with 
both own and group behavior.  On the other hand, it limits variation in the peer group variable 
substantially and leads to less efficient results and a possible failure to detect endogenous peer 
effects even when they are present.   
 
V.    Primary Results 
Table 2 shows first-stage correlations for our instrumental variables regressions.  Overall 
the correlations are quite high, though they are somewhat less so for the smoking and sex 
outcome variables.  Also, the instrumental variable is more strongly correlated with average peer 
group behavior when we use friends and extended friends as the peer group measure and much 
weaker when we use school-grade cohorts as the peer group measure.  We report our main 
regression results in Table 3.  We consider four outcomes: GPA, smoking, sexual behavior and 
drinking.  We report results for two different estimation methods: school fixed effects with 
individual controls, and instrumental variables estimation with school fixed effects and 
individual controls.  Each regression requires data on the individual’s own behavior and data on 
at least one friend in the network.  Because of the large degree of missing information in the 
  12Add-Health data, these requirements substantially restrict our sample sizes in many cases, 
especially in the case of regressions using the In-Home data.   
Rows 1 and 2 of Table 3 present results for networks defined as friends and extended 
friends, respectively.  We see positive and significant estimates of β in all columns though 
results are a bit weaker for the IV regressions in most cases.  For each of the outcome variables, 
we see that the school fixed effects estimates are smaller than the instrumental variables 
estimates.  This is perhaps counterintuitive because we expect the estimate former to be biased 
by both the reflection problem and individual-level unobserved heterogeneity while the latter 
should only be biased by individual-level heterogeneity that is correlated with the instrument.  
One explanation for this might be the existence of reporting (measurement) errors in the 
endogenous variable.  Under appropriate conditions, IV will eliminate the attenuation bias that is 
associated with this measurement error.  If so, IV will yield larger coefficient estimates.  This 
may happen even when there are other sources of bias in the OLS estimates that would bias the 
OLS results upwards.   
Row 3 reports results for regressions using school-grade cohorts as the relevant peer 
group measure.  When we compare these results to those in rows 1 and 2, we see that the 
estimates are much weaker across all outcome variables when using school grade cohorts.  In 
fact, the estimates for sexual behavior and drinking are negative and insignificant.  In general, 
the results in row 3 are less efficient and the point estimates are more unstable.   For example, 
the school fixed effects estimates for the smoking variable are negative and significant (row 3, 
column 3), but become positive and significant in the instrumental variables regression (row 3, 
  13column 4).  Similarly, for the drinking variable, the OLS point estimate is positive and the IV 
point estimate is negative (row 3, columns 7 and 8).
5   
One possible explanation of the weaker and less stable estimates in row 3 is that the 
school-grade cohorts are crude approximations of the pupil’s actual network.  It is possible that 
this prevents us from capturing much of the endogenous peer effect.  The weaker results and lack 
of stability may further be symptomatic of inefficiency stemming from less within-school 
variation (see Figure 2).  Also, the instrumental variables estimates in row 3 are particularly 
weak due to near collinearity of the instruments.  The required rank condition is therefore only 
barely satisfied (Bound, Jaeger and Baker 1995).   
This raises an important point concerning the use of school-grade cohorts as a measure of 
peer group.  This definition of the peer group precludes using both school dummies and 
instrumental variables that only vary at the school level.  As a result, researchers face a difficult 
choice between addressing the school-level correlated effects but not the reflection problem, 
addressing the reflection problem but not the school-level correlated effects or addressing both 
but falling victim to weak instruments.  In contrast, the use of the two definitions based on the 
Add-Health friend files allows us to address both the reflection problem and the school-level 
correlated effects without falling prey to weak instruments. 
Next, we compare rows 1 and 2 of Table 3.  We see that for all four outcome variables, 
the estimates using the extended friends networks are larger than those using the smaller friends 
networks.  These results indicate the possible presence of non-linearities in peer effects.  For 
example, extending the network may include additional pupils in the network who are not 
directly friends with the respondents but who, nevertheless, provide further avenues of influence.  
To investigate this idea further, we examine whether adolescents are particularly influenced by 
                                                 
5 We also examine all of these results broken down by gender but do not see any salient patterns. 
  14not just the average peer in their friend network, but by the behavior of peers at the extremes of 
the networks, the so-called bad apples or goody two shoes of the group.   
 
VI.  Bad Apples and Goody Two Shoes 
  In this section we ask whether or not adolescents are more or less sensitive to the 
behaviors of their peers at either of the extremes of the network.  The question is relevant to 
many educational policy debates.  For example, one common criticism of school vouchers is that 
the policy allows “cream-skimming”. The fear is that better-performing schools will skim top 
pupils away from lower-performing schools.  If students are heavily influenced by peers at the 
extremes of their networks this “cream-skimming” will have a particularly negative impact for 
students who are left behind.  Another example of the relevance of this question is a hard line 
policy on expulsion that tends to eliminate pupils from the bottom of the networks.  If 
adolescents are not particularly influenced by the bad apples in their networks this policy is less 
defensible than otherwise.   
We estimate a modification of equation (3): 




ist ave ist ist x y y y y ε + α + δ + λ + β + + β + β =       (4) 
where  and .  The parameters  and   give the 
average student’s sensitivity to the behavior of the “bad apple” and the “goody two shoes” of the 
network.  With some abuse of notation, the marginal effect of a change in the behavior at the 
extremes is given by  
} G j : y { max y ist jst
j
max
ist ∈ = } G j : y min{ y ist jst
j
min
ist ∈ = max β min β
max ave
1
ist max N ME β + β =
−  
and  
  15min ave
1
ist min N ME β + β =
−  
where, is the number of pupils in the network as before.  These marginal effects have two 
components.  The first operates through the effect on mean behavior and is given by  .  
The second determines the sensitivity of own behavior to the extremes and is given by the 
parameters and  .  These parameters give the effect of increasing the maximum or 
minimum of behavior in the network while holding average behavior constant.  If the pupil is 
less sensitive to an increase in behavior at the maximum (minimum) of the distribution than he is 
to a change closer to the center then we should observe that 
ist N




max β min β
0 max < β  ( 0 min < β ).  
  We estimate these models using OLS with a complete set of school dummies.  We 
consider all three network definitions.  We consider are GPA, smoking and drinking outcomes, 
but not sexual behavior.  Because our variable for sexual behavior is a binary outcome and 
because most networks have at least one person who purports to have had sex and one person 
who does not, examining the effect of the maximum and minimum is not useful.  We 
acknowledge that OLS with school dummies leaves us vulnerable to empirical problems as 
discussed in Section III.  However, the use of more robust methods such as IV with school 
effects is hampered by a lack of defensible instruments for changes in the extremes of the 
network distribution.  Accordingly, these results are only suggestive.  However, they do suggest 
that the definition of peer groups have a significant impact on estimation of peer effects. 
  We report results for estimation of equation (4) in Table 4.  For regressions using peer 
group measures based on friends and extended friends networks, we find that both   0 max < β  
and .  For school achievement, smoking and drinking, this suggests that own behavior is 
less responsive to a change in the behavior of either the goody two shoes or the bad apple than it 
is to the behavior of people who are more average in these behaviors.  In contrast, the estimates 
0 min < β
  16using the school grade cohorts suggest the opposite, namely, that   and 0 max > β 0 min > β .  
However, we caution against a too strict interpretation of these results noting that there is a 
considerable lack of variation in the distribution of behavior across school-grade cohorts within 
schools.     
  We can use the estimates of effects on school achievement in Column 1 of Table 4 to 
examine the hypothetical impacts of school vouchers and expulsion on own behavior.  School 
vouchers will tend to extract the goody two shoes from the network and send him to another 
school where ostensibly the opportunities are better.  In contrast, a hard-line policy on expulsion 
will tend to extract the bad apple from the network.  First, suppose that the goody two shoes 
leaves a group with four members but is replaced by another pupil who is still the maximum of 
the distribution but has a GPA that is 0.1 points lower.  This will have a negative effect on the 
pupil’s GPA with magnitude:  0.009 11 . 0
00 . 4
80 . 0





⎛ − = β + β .  Second, 
suppose that the bad apple is expelled but is replaced by another pupil who is still the minimum 
but has a GPA that is 0.1 points higher.  This will have a positive effect on the pupil’s GPA with 
magnitude:  0.003 17 . 0
00 . 4
80 . 0





⎛ − = β + β .  These simple calculations 
suggest that own behavior may not be very sensitive to what is happening at the extremes of the 
networks.  The suggestion is that the costs of school vouchers and the benefits of expulsion may 
not be very large.   
 
VII. Conclusions 
  In this paper, we explore the role of peer group definitions in the estimation of 
endogenous peer effects in GPA, drinking, smoking and sexual behavior using the National 
  17Longitudinal Adolescent Health Survey.  Under appropriate identifying assumptions we provide 
evidence of endogenous peer effects in school performance and the propensity to have sex, drink 
and smoke.  But we also find that the magnitudes of estimates differ quite widely depending on 
the definition of peer groups.  Because definition of peer groups is often ad-hoc in the existing 
literature, we find this variation in estimates further highlights the need to justify use of 
particular definitions.   
We find that estimates that are based on the pupil’s friend nominations tend to be larger 
than those that are based on school-grade cohorts.  We also argue that use of school-grade 
cohorts makes it difficult for researchers to address both the reflection problem and school-level 
correlated effects due to limited within-school variation in peer network variation.  Moreover, 
these network definitions result in weak instruments if the instruments are also defined at the 
school-grade cohort level due to the near collinearity of the instrument with a set of school 
dummies.  Finally, we provide evidence that measurement error in peer behavior and peer 
network definition may lead to underestimates of peer effects in many contexts. 
We concluded by investigating how the behavior of the pupil responds to changes in the 
behavior of his peers at the extremes of his network.  We provide evidence that sensitivity to 
behavior at the extremes may not be as large as it is to behavior towards the middle.  This 
suggests that the externalities associated with manipulating the extremes of the peer network will 
not be as large as those that come from manipulating the center of the network.  However, we 
caution that these results are only suggestive and that more work is necessary before more 
substantive conclusions can be reached.       
  18Appendix A.  Peer group definitions in the education literature. 
Study  Definition of Peer Group 
Gaviria and Raphael, 2001  School cohorts 
Angrist and Lang, 2004  School-grade cohorts 
Arcidiacono and Nicholson, 2005 School-grade  cohorts 
Carrell, Malmstrom and West, 2007  School-grade cohorts 
Hanushek, Markman, Kain and Rivkin, 2001  School-grade cohorts 
Hoxby, 2000  School-grade cohorts 
Lavy, Paserman, and Schlosser, 2007  School-grade cohorts 
Burke and Sass, 2006  Classroom 
Vigdor and Nechbya, 2004  Classroom 
Duncan et al, 2005  Roommates 
Sacerdote, 2001  Roommates 
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Table 1A.  Summary of Adolescent Characteristics in 1994 Survey Year. 
 
















































    
Notes:  Standard deviations in parentheses.   
This table summarizes network information for the in-school sample.  Unless otherwise noted, averages are 
based on a sub-sample of approximately 60,000 observations.  
1 Indicator for whether or not parent has a college education. 
 
 

















Table 1C: Peer Group Averages 




# Cigs Per Day  
(In-Home Survey) 
# Days Drank Last Year  Ever 
Have 
Sex? 

















































































                   
Note:  This table reports the mean and standard deviation for the mean, max and min of the network’s behavior.  Standard deviations are in parentheses. 
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Table 2.  First-Stage Correlations. 





























Each cell of this table reports the F-test and associated p-value in brackets of a test of the null that the 
excluded instruments from our IV regressions are significant in the first state regressions.  All regressions 





Table 3.  Average Peer Effects 
  [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] 








































R2  0.2961 0.2565 0.1341 0.2549 0.2200 0.1566 0.0797 0.0353 
NT
2  25934 24938 743  654  2750  2354  37918 35906 



















R2  0.2853 0.2772 0.1194 0.0000 0.2166 0.1739 0.0814 0.0554 
NT
2  26740 26532 824  744  2751  2450  38015 37551 



















R2  0.2102 0.2112 0.1018 0.0408 0.1810 0.1955 0.0598 0.0375 
NT
1  32419  32419  3174 3161 8192 8159 46275  35906 
Survey School School Home  Home Home Home School  School 
Notes:  All regressions include grade and, when appropriate,  gender dummies.  T-statistics are in 
brackets.  All standard errors adjust for clustering on schools.  Reported sample sizes for the 
individual fixed-effects regressions includes individuals for whom there was only a single 
observation.  All regressions include additional controls such as health status as well as race 
dummies and parental education.  
1 Refers to individual-time observations. 25
Table 4. Bad Apples and Goody Two Shoes 
 [1]  [2]  [3]  [4]  [5] [6] [7]  [8] [9] 








































































Survey School  School  School  Home Home Home School School  School 
R2  0.2580 0.2528 0.1312 0.0937  0.0747 0.1098 0.0634  0.0645 0.0494 
NT
1  41104 42605 53621  1205  2304  9630  62085  62337 78914 
Notes:  All regressions include grade and gender dummies.  T-statistics are in brackets.  All standard errors adjust for clustering on schools. 
1 Refers to individual-time observations.
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